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T wo years ago it was widely accepted that we were in the grips of ane-husiness revolution. According to many, we were set to move into"hyper growth," with trade over the Internet reaching trillions of dol-lars.' The Internet and e-business were leading topics of popular atten-
tion, as evidenced in TV shows and the fascination of investors. Indeed, many
investors, large and small, were convinced that an economic miracle was under-
way—driving the valuation of "virtual" firms to the level of an Internet Bubble.^
A survey found executives believing that the Internet would have major impact
on global business by 2001.'
As we all know, the bubble burst in April 2000 and the impact was
certainly not one those executives might have predicted. By March 2001, the
NASDAQ was back to its pre-bubble level, forecasters were scaling back their
projections and e-business luminaries such as Jeff Bezos were advising investors
against Internet stocks." These warnings came too late for those investors who
had lost their money on the many spectacular failures that occurred over this
period. Some Internet boosters were even calling for "netizens" to show their
support for the online economy to combat what they saw as a "viral lack of con-
fidence."' In just two years, we have gone from heralding the second Industrial
Revolution—Business 2.0 in the eyes of the revolutionaries—to intense
pessimism.
We would like to thank Homa Bahrami, Chong Choi, Stuart Evans, Robert Grant, Alessandro Lomi,
Peter McNamara, and the editor and two anonymous referees of this journal for their encouraging and
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. We are grateful for financial support from the Eco-
nomic and Sociai Research Council, UK, and the CNR (Council for National Research), Italy. We also
wish to thank the firms that provided access, and the many managers who provided their time willingly
to help us in the project.
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It is timely and appropriate to take stock of this "revolution." It is appro-
priate because, just as the hyperbole of the 1990s was clearly overblown, the
pessimism of 2001 is also an overreaction. Internet usage continues to grow
strongly throughout the world and, in contrast to the failed dotcoms, many
traditional firms have found viable applications for Web technology. For exam-
ple, in a recent survey of 400+ large listed companies, 20 per cent indicated that
they had successfully implemented web-based applications.* What is at issue is
not whether the Internet facilitates communication or provides access to infor-
mation and entertainment. It does all of these things and more. The Internet
itself may indeed represent a revolution in communication. Yet to us the real,
and still unresolved, issue is whether it represents a revolution in the conduct of
business. Will the visionary predictions about e-business ultimately be proved
correct or will the reality be more mundane? Will a significant proportion of
economic activity, be it B2C or B2B, be transacted through the Web or only a
minor amount? Will the Internet be a pervasive business technology—as some
still predict''—or simply a niche application?
It is appropriate to take stock because many firms are uncertain about
their answers to such fundamental questions of strategy, and with good reason:
• We have gone from boom to bust in a short period of time. The 80 per
cent rise in the NASDAQ in a period of slightly more than a year was
probably always going to be unsustainable. However, the subsequent
dramatic collapse to pre-bubble levels has still damaged expectations
around Internet pure plays and must therefore engender caution among
the managers of the Fortune 500.
• Having experienced disappointing results in the past (e.g., BPR), man-
agers are cautious about large IT investments, particularly suggestions
that IT be elevated to core business strategy levels.
• The pragmatic difficulty of implementing complex IT strategies is another,
altogether more difficult, task. Despite the money invested in consulting
advice over the past decade, managers have struggled with the same set
of implementation problems.*
• The competitive necessity for e-business varies considerably from industry
to industry. Firms are exposed to wide-ranging levels of competition, from
slow- to fast-moving traditional rivals and Internet-based newcomers. In
some industries, e-business is a threat; in many, it is not.
• The promises of Internet-driven economic growth may actually be more
hyperbole than substance. We should question the pace at which the
"networked" economy may emerge and, indeed, the ultimate suitability
of electronically based business for many firms.
With most revolutions, those participants immersed in the events may
not know that they witnessed history until historians have told them that some-
thing truly spectacular had occurred. For example, can we say with certainty
whether the crash of 2000 signals the death of an over-hyped technology or
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does it simply signal a "little slowdown" in the transition to a fully networked
economy?' In spite of the negative effects of the crash, one study finds that
nearly 80 per cent of firms surveyed are increasing their level of investment.'"
Only with some understanding of the economic forces at play can we hope to
make sense of these opposing views and assess whether current events are
pointing more toward one of these extremes or toward some middle course.
A revolution can he defined by the breadth and depth of the changes
it makes in the everyday lives of individuals. In this sense, what we have and
are witnessing in terms of the changes wrought by transistors can be justifiably
thought of as being revolutionary." Similarly, the Internet as a low-cost com-
munication tool may also have revolutionary social impact. However, e-business
cannot claim, at this time, to have radically changed the way the majority of
people shop or the way most business is conducted on a day-to-day basis. Thus,
current events point us more towards an incremental evolution for e-business
than a revolution. Such incremental evolution is illustrated by Tesco's cautious
and "low-tech" approach to online grocery sales, which has resulted in the only
current success story in this sector of e-business.'^
This distinction between evolution and revolution is important. If we are
witnessing evolution, this is familiar territory for most managers. If we are wit-
nessing revolution, this is uncharted territory where irreversible commitments
and new strategies are needed and firms may fail. To form a better judgment as
to which is more likely, we ask two important questions: where is e-business
concentrated; and why is e-business occurring as it is?
Where Is E-Business Concentrated?
One of the valuable lessons from prior encounters with technological
change is that there is often a difference between espoused theories (what we say
about the technology) and theories-in-use (how we actually use the technology)."
Nowhere was this difference more evident than during the Internet bubble. The
espoused theory was that, while the Internet would impact all forms of business,
the greatest impact would be in consumer markets. The B2C "revolution" was
promoted as offering consumers 24/7 convenience and lower prices and offering
firms the opportunity to build closer and more personalized relationships with
their customers. The less glamorous B2B "revolution" emerged a little later. This
was also touted as having major impact, particularly in integrating supply chains
and reducing transaction costs.
Technology-In- Use
At present the PC is the dominant platform for network connectivity and
according to statistical sources two-thirds of adults in the developed world still
lack or choose not to use the Internet on a weekly basis (Exhibit 1). Even in the
most networked countries, only half the adult population accesses the Internet,
either at home or in the office, on a weekly basis. For those who do, the Internet
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E X H I B I T I . Penetration of Adult Internet Users at Year-end 2000
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has proven to be more of an addition to their lives—sometimes helpful, at times
entertaining, often slow and frustrating—than an indispensable part of their
lives.'* For the average household, e-mail provides a useful and cheap capability
to communicate asynchronously. Although at times difficult to navigate, the
ability to retrieve information has been a beneficial innovation. Yet despite the
convenience of purchasing items online, only a small proportion of consumer
spending has migrated onto the Internet.
To date, the beneficiaries have been those selling books, toys, CDs, and
computer equipment. Few of these have Internet sales that claim a significant
share of their respective markets, even for the highly discussed category of books
"e-tailers" claimed only 6 per cent of book sales in the USA in 2000.'' The only
category where online sales have reached major proportions is airline tickets,
with 58 per cent of tickets being sold online in the USA in 2000.'* There is as
yet little evidence suggesting the widespread transferability of profitable elec-
tronic business models to other consumer markets. For example, companies
such as Peapod and Webvan (deceased) invested millions of dollars into solving
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a mundane problem most of us face every week, shopping for groceries. Yet
despite the best efforts of these companies, less than 1 per cent of U.S. house-
holds order groceries online.''' The empirical evidence suggests that many see
this task as one of life's small social pleasures that they have no intention of
giving up. Additionally, the information asymmetry problem means that many
of the products and services we purchase have to be seen, felt, or touched before
they can be appreciated. There are still many barriers to be overcome before we
can even begin to speak of B2C as revolutionary—i.e., changing the outlook and
behavior of consumers in a fundamental way.
Indeed, most businesses are less interested in selling online to consumers
than in using the Internet to interact with suppliers and large buyers. There are
several reasons why businesses are more willing than consumers to communi-
cate, negotiate, and buy and sell online:
• Companies—and, in particular, larger companies—are better equipped
to communicate electronically. They have the computers, networks, and
bandwidth to make Internet use faster and more convenient.
• Companies are more cost-conscious—every dollar saved in procurement
equals a dollar of new profit.
• Network externalities will have a strong impact, as corporations develop
supply chain applications aimed at reducing costs and increasing effi-
ciency. The natural tendency for these companies will be to encourage
others to do the same and generate further efficiency gains.
• The diffusion of innovation literature has shown that products consumed
in the workplace diffuse more rapidly than products consumed privately
in one's own home.'*
• Many business transactions are already conducted at a distance, by fac-
simile, mail, or EDI. These are easily translated to the Internet.
• Opportunities to create close alliances with business partners can offer
innovative opportunities to form strategic relationships or address cus-
tomer problems in new ways.
For companies such as Ford, General Electric, Dell, and Cisco, the movement of
products from detailed designs to basic commodities through a supply chain is
where the real value in e-business will be found. With prescience, Aberdeen's
David Alschuler stated in 1999 that "the fact is, business on the Internet is cut-
ting significant cost out of the supply chain, with better procurement and
resource planning. That stuff shows up as line items on balance sheets of com-
panies like Intel, but in the long run, that will have a far bigger impact than
what you buy from Amazon.""
Although predictions about the impact of e-business on supply chains
have also been revised downward post-bubble, they still remain significant. For
example, the Gartner Group expects some $6 trillion in global B2B transactions
to be made online in 2004—predictions that are backed by emerging evidence
of the real savings that can be made in such transactions.^"
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As we enter a new phase in e-business development, established firms—
branded goods suppliers, physical retailers, and financial service providers—are
beginning to get involved with the networked economy. This will shift attention
from growth strategies adopted by start-ups (i.e., Amazon and E*Trade), towards
strategies that deliver sustainable competitive advantage for large, well-estab-
lished firms (e.g., Unilever, Carrefour, General Electric, and Citibank).
Why Is E-Business Occurring as It Is?
In the six years since the browser made the Internet accessible to the
broader community, the novelty has begun to fade and some of the early fears
around electronic transactions have begun to subside.^' In many countries, there
are signs of a general maturing of the community of users and the impact the
Internet will have on the lives of ordinary people is becoming clearer. For busi-
ness, however, the answer to that all-important question of how to make money
is much less clear. Despite billions of dollars in investment, firms are still strug-
gling to find the best way to complement traditional activities or develop new
electronic lines of business. In part these difficulties might be ascribed to the
problems of understanding, entry timing, and resource commitment that firms
(particularly incumbent firms) encounter when faced by an emerging technol-
ogy.̂ ^ However, any such problems have been exacerbated by the diffuse and ill-
understood nature of Internet technology, particularly its application to business
transactions. For example, by 1998, firms had tested no less than eleven distinct
e-business models in the marketplace.^' Most of these subsequently failed, lead-
ing some to suggest that managers became so focused on IT innovation that they
failed to apply the underlying principles of business.̂ "* These problems of busi-
ness application persist to the current day. They include poor understanding of
the costs and benefits of e-business technology and therefore uncertainty about
eventual returns to investment. They also include significant difficulties in build-
ing usable customer interfaces, integrating e-business with legacy IT systems, or
aligning organizational structures with new business models.^'
Although the end game is still distant, e-business has so far failed to trans-
form business in a significant way. Certainly we have seen savings in the time
and cost of routine tasks (i.e., buying and selling shares, tracking inventory, and
delivery schedules), but few of the visionary predictions concerning the e-busi-
ness revolution have materialized. The most salient insight emerging is that the
principles that have governed business success for centuries remain largely the
same. Despite the hyperbole, the ability to predict the future is still firmly
grounded in the past. Exhibit 2 summarizes these visionary predictions and
our assessment of the current reality.
Brands Will Die!
A common belief was that the low setup and distribution costs associated
with the new electronic capability would enable a one-person business to make
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E X H I B I T 2. E-Predictions and E-Reality
Prediction State of Current Reaiity
Brands Will Die!
The Internet represents a major
threat to brands, making brand
strength weaker than ever
before.
In an over communicated environment the Internet provides no guarantees
of customer attention or increased search. It is likely, therefore, that users will
continue to gravitate towards brands as a way to simplify choices, minimize
search and build trust. Cognitive 'lock in' to branded Web sites may amplify
these effects.Thus brands remain as powerful a marketing tool online as they
were offline.
Prices Will Fall)
E-business will lead to more
efficient markets and lower
prices.
MiddiemenWiliDiel
In every industry—from retailing
to insurance—the key impact of
the computer-network revolution
is to remove the middleman.
Reduced information exchange and coordination costs have enabled firms to
capture a larger part of the customer value proposition. While the cost of
getting the right item to the right customer has got cheaper, there is no
guarantee that this will result in lower prices. Speculation about whether prices
will go up or fall is something of a red herring.
We have still seen few examples of successful disintermediation resulting from
e-business investment This has nothing to do with whether profits are possible.
Rather it has everything to do with the difficulty of working out how to move
into a new distribution channel without jeopardizing existing channel
relationships.
Scale Is Irrelevant!
Esther Dyson, has suggested that
size will be less important for
online firms.
Being First Is the Key!
In the networked economy, speed
is God and first movers will reap
the rewards.
Winner Take All!
In the networked economy the
first to develop an advantage will
capture all the rewards.
Networks, be they real or virtual, work to a relatively simple logic.The larger
the network, the more attractive it is to users. Markets for portal companies
(e,g.,Yahoo,com), hardware (e,g,, Intel) and software (e,g,, Microsoft) all provide
recent examples of companies deriving increased value from wider reach.
Equally standardization of inter-organizational systems will require governance
mechanisms and large firms will leverage their bargaining power to encourage
co-operation among channel members. Such co-operation is often in the best
interests of the large firm.
There is no guarantee that pioneering firms like Amazon or eBay will be able
to maintain their position as the market evolves. Information technologies, by
themselves, will not produce sustainable competitive advantage and pioneers
must be careful not to develop the 'wrong' resources. Provided the pioneer has
failed to build a defensible position, the early follower is often well positioned
to exploit their existing resources and core competencies. In many cases, the
early follower has complementary assets (e.g,, brands) that will be their basis
of competition.
Markets with distinct segments of customers or firms with valuable offline
capabilities will allow more than one firm to capture rewands. While it is
possible that the Web might lead to greater concentration of site traffic, it is
an unresolved question as to whether this will lead to profit dominance.
its virtual storefront available to as many customers as reached by bigger firms.
This would be possible through the use of intelligent agents and search tech-
nologies that would reduce search costs and enable customers to compare prod-
ucts and prices anywhere in the world easily. Such comparisons would erode the
overall role of the brand in choice as well as threaten existing brands command-
ing price premiums.^*
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Evidence indicates that these predictions have yet to approximate reality,
indeed the role of the brand appears just as important in online purchasing as
it does offline. Commercial surveys report that consumers believe brand names
play a significant role in their online buying decisions and Internet pure plays
have spent vast amounts on traditional brand-building exercises.^^ As Barwise
argues, in a busy, "over communicated and untrustworthy world," consumers
continue to gravitate towards brands as a way to simplify choices.^* He suggests
two reasons for this: brand names can act as substitutes for information gather-
ing, helping online buyers locate specific products; and brands build trust, secu-
rity, and expectations of quality.
More recently, evidence has emerged that individuals do not use the Web
to search more exhaustively, despite its lower search costs. Indeed, the emerging
picture is that many focus on one web site in their purchase category of interest
and seldom look at competing sites. This has been attributed to "cognitive lock-
in."^' That is, once the customer has invested in learning how one site works,
there is little incentive for them to incur the costs of learning others. If this is
the case, then it is likely that the strength of the brand continues to be impor-
tant, particularly in influencing the customer's choice of which web site to learn.
As a final nail in the coffin of theories suggesting increased search, comparison
sites such as Brandwise (see sidebar) have proved unpopular. Brandwise existed
to make it easy for consumers to compare home appliances and was backed by
major players. However, after having failed to attract either traffic or further
funding, it closed its doors. Despite the increased availability of information, the
Internet provides no guarantee of increased search or customer attention, and
traditional branding lessons still apply.
As well as these customer-based reasons for the importance of brands,
there are also competitive rationales. There is a long tradition of research in
industrial economics showing the potential for strong brands to act as an entry
barrier to other firms. For example, Schmalensee documented how incumbents
could deter market entry by proliferating their brands.'" Others have shown not
R.I.P. Brandwise.com, November 2000
Brandwise.com was a comparison-shopping web site designed to assist con-
sumers in narrowing down their selections from the plethora of products currently
available in the marketplace. As a joint venture between Whirlpool, publishing
firm Hearst, and The Boston Consulting Group, the venture claimed to provide
independent customer advice.
A consumer laboratory examined all washing machines, dryers, refrigera-
tors, microwaves, dishwashers, and cooking units available in the marketplace
and reported their advantages and shortcomings. Brandwise.com also hosted chat
rooms where customers could ask for advice from other customers who bought the
same machines.
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only that such proliferation is a common strategy," but also that proprietary
assets such as brand names provide "effective deterrents," even to challenges
from innovative competitors."
There are three main factors with regard to how brand strength can be
enhanced by an online presence: the brand's ability to attract attention, the
nature of the brand appeal, and the level of customer involvement with the
product or service category.
• Ability to Attract Attention—Is the brand capable of attracting customers
to the firm's Web site and thus facilitating cognitive lock-in? This factor
favors incumbents with well-known brands, though novel new brands
backed by significant product or service innovations have scope to enter
or create markets. This scope is little changed from the pre-Web era—e.g.,
it is hard to displace entrenched competitors and even harder to create
new markets. Another element in creating attraction may be the breadth
of assortment offered. It is striking how many of the sites with strong
brands offer many products or services to their customers. This observa-
tion can be made about manufacturer brands (e.g.. Dell), retail brands
(e.g., Amazon) and portals (e.g., Kelkoo). V/e speculate that low search
and cognitive lock-in may also be connected to the choice of a site that
provides convenient access to a broad assortment. Firms with narrow
product lines may need to promote themselves through intermediaries—
just as they did before the Internet.
• The Nature of the Brand Appeal—Is branding used to convey beliefs regard-
ing product attributes (e.g., UPS same-day parcel delivery), or is it based
more on emotional associations (e.g., L'Oreal cosmetics)? Attribute-based
branding may be more suited to the informational nature of the Web
interface while emotion-based branding may require a more dynamic
medium than the Internet can currently deliver.''
• Level of Customer Involvement—Is the product category a high involvement
one such as cars, which requires deliberation prior to purchase, or is it a
low involvement one such as candy that simply requires action rather
than deliberation? Again the nature of the Web better suits thinking and
feeling before action as opposed to thinking and feeling after action.
While combinations of these three factors potentially create many scenar-
ios, most do not suit the Internet except as a complement to more traditional
marketing approaches. However, two scenarios are of interest. First, strong
brands can be reinforced online, in a major or minor way depending on the
nature of their original appeal. Second, new "cyberbrands" can be created where
existing brands are weaker or do not exist or where the V̂ 'eb interface suits the
appeal significantly better than the traditional media does.
• Brand Reinforcement—Most buyers require assurances that goods are
unused, properly identified, and legitimately obtained before they will
source from an unknown supplier. This tends to favor larger, incumbent
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brands, like L'Oreal and Charles Schwab in the consumer marketplace,
or independent distributors, like NECX in the business marketplace. This
is especially so for customers who feel more secure dealing with a known
brand. Even though many incumbents are just starting to move their
businesses online, the strength of their brand may continue to provide
distinct advantage—particularly where they have greater ability to attract
customers to their site or where the nature of the appeal requires exper-
tise in a range of media. Whether the Web becomes a major or minor
component of their marketing strategy will depend on the nature of this
appeal and the customer's level of involvement. For example, it is harder
to see the Web as a major component in sales of cosmetics (emotional
appeal high involvement), ice cream (emotional appeal, low involve-
ment), or detergent (which while an attribute appeal is also low involve-
ment). In contrast, for automobiles (attribute appeal, high involvement)
the Web can play a significant role in pre-purchase search.
• Cyberbrand Creation—Companies like eBay and Amazon are examples
of a small number of cyberbrand companies, aimed at providing total
customer-centric solutions. These cyberbrands are all-encompassing and
link promotional strategies with web site design and payment with distri-
bution to provide a fully integrated solution. They are also attacking rela-
tively fragmented markets with an appeal that suits the Internet medium
and with a significant level of innovation in the service delivered to their
customers. Moreover, participation in an auction or the purchase of a
book requires a reasonable level of involvement from these customers.
Cyberbrands such as these have opportunities to play a powerful role and
compete directly against many traditional brands.'" This notwithstanding,
the incumbents are still in a strong position; a fact recognized by those
cyberbrands that made marketing investments to build brand awareness
and attract customers to their sites. Equally important is the need to cre-
ate a relationship of trust with customers as evident by the recent acquisi-
tion of traditional companies by Internet start-ups. The acquisition of
Butterfield and Butterfield, a highly respected firm of auctioneers, by
eBay represented a deliberate attempt to improve the cognitive associa-
tion between the eBay brand and its services. Online as well as offline,
as the Boston Consulting Group notes, "The brand is everything and
everything is the brand. "^'
Prices Will Fall!
Espoused theory also suggested that a combination of increased competi-
tion and improved price discovery would transform market efficiency and thus
dramatically reduce the price of goods and services traded online. Although the
networked economy can provide opportunities for lower prices, the same infra-
structure can also be used to collect customer and competitor information in
ways that maintain an incumbent's oligopoly power. For example, much is
66 CALIFORNIA MANACEMENT REVIEW VOL 44, NO, I FALL 2001
E-Business: Revolution, Evolution, or Hype?
made of the Web-bot technology that allows consumers to scour the web for the
lowest car price, mortgage rate, or airline tickets—a technology clearly aimed at
lowering prices. However, there is nothing to stop competing firms from using a
similar technology as a means of coordinating behavior and keeping prices high.
It was not so long ago (the early 1990s) that the airlines were caught using their
reservation systems as a means of signaling price increases. Adam Smith was
worried that "people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merri-
ment and diversion, but the conversation ends . . . in some contrivance to raise
prices." The web can make such "contrivances" virtual."^
The one thing we can be sure about is that prices will continue to vary as
sellers utilize individual strategies to avoid commoditization. The real question is
whether or not this increases or decreases consumer surplus and where the pro-
ducer rents accrue. One positive outcome would be for firms to use their access
to online information and coordination to deliver products in a more effective
way, leading to a possibly higher final price but with a greater overall value
proposition to customers. In this way, the Internet provides not just a redistribu-
tion of rents, but also the creation of value through the reduction of deadweight
loss due to informational inefficiencies and transaction costs. On the downside,
firms could use a number of techniques to extract more rent from consumers,
including: price discrimination and various versioning strategies; market seg-
mentation strategies that make comparative shopping difficult; and exploiting
the potential of cognitive lock-in to maintain or enhance price premiums.
Consider the case of a supplier who collects customer information using
an online registration form. The customer is willing to divulge personal informa-
tion in return for a customized service and has invested in learning the Web site.
The supplier, in turn, uses this information to make inferences regarding the
customer's beliefs, attitudes, and buying behavior. Based on this improved infor-
mation, the supplier is able to differentiate the service in ways that target the
customer's price limits, extracting maximum rents.
On the positive side, the value proposition to consumers is enhanced by
integrating the value chain. For example, Shopfast.com, an Australian grocery
shopping service, envisions a world where consumers will look to its company
to maintain their household inventories in the same way that point of sales ter-
minals do for stores. When a person takes a can of soup from their pantry, they
can scan the barcode; this tells Shopfast that the consumer wants this item
restocked. Then according to their delivery schedule, the soup, and whatever
else was requested, would be delivered to the customer. Although Shopfast.com
will not charge you less for the can of soup, they will charge you less for the
whole proposition of getting the can of soup into your pantry.
The main impact of e-business is the ability to reduce the cost of exchang-
ing and processing information, thereby reducing the overall costs of customiza-
tion—either between a producer and a supplier or a customer and a product or
service provider. The potential is not that the bottle of Coke or metallic widget
will necessarily get cheaper, but that the cost of getting the right item to the
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right customer will get cheaper. Value system change has occurred where par-
ticular upstream and downstream activities have been opened up or better tai-
lored to customer needs. Therefore, what we are seeing is a new transactional
medium being formed that is designed to reduce deadweight losses. For exam-
ple, the growing importance of auctions is not because we know more about
auctions but that the medium allows us to use them in a greater variety of cir-
cumstances. Technology is allowing us to capture a larger part of the whole cus-
tomer proposition. As such, speculation about whether prices will rise or fall is
something of a red herring. They could go up or down. Whether it will be the
customer, supplier, or intermediary who captures any surplus from this effi-
ciency gain is an altogether more complex question than popular theory
purports.
The empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of an incremen-
tally more efficient medium rather than a price revolution. For example, the real
prices of books and CDs were some 9 per cent to 16 per cent lower through
online retailers than through traditional booksellers in 1998 and 1999." For
another, the growth of the Internet has reduced the prices for term life insur-
ance by some 8 per cent to 15 per cent.'* A study of internet retailing of auto-
mobiles showed a savings of $450 per auto,'' driven by a combination of
business being picked up by cheaper dealers, lower customer service costs, and
the bargaining power of the referral service. In the B2B space, both case studies
and commercial data suggest somewhat greater price reductions in the order
of 14 per cent to 19 per cent."" However, these price reductions come at a cost in
terms of IT implementation, systems integration, and human resource utilization
that are daunting for many firms."' Two other features of these data are perhaps
more interesting, namely, auctions and price dispersion.
• Auctions—Studies of Internet auctions for used cars have suggested that
the price levels attained over the Internet may be higher than in tradi-
tional auctions. As noted by Smith et al., an auction market is inherently
different to a retail market and "higher prices may be a signal of more
efficient auction markets ceteris paribus.""^ This depends on the liquidity
of the market—with greater liquidity improving the match between buy-
ers willing to pay and sellers willing to sell—and the number and types
of buyers and sellers. For example, creating a global yard sale out of the
millions of local weekend yard sales may be more efficient but does not
necessarily lead to lower prices, particularly if the number of bidders is
less limited than the number of items for sale. Whether a price rises or
falls depends on whether the reach of the Internet increases the relative
number of buyers or relative number of sellers compared with those
found before in local markets.*'
• Price Dispersion and Competition—Studies show that while consumer prices
may be somewhat lower on the Internet, price dispersion between retail
brands is significant, persistent, and similar in magnitude to that observed
in traditional markets."" This has been ascribed to brand specific factors
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such as trust and awareness—that is, to the way the retailers compete.
This is the key issue: whether price levels rise or fall or whether price
dispersion increases or decreases is at least partially dependent on the
patterns of competition that evolve between online players. As in the
offline world, these players can choose to create undifferentiated com-
modities sold on price alone or they can choose to create differentiated
value propositions.
Firms can resist comparison-shopping and price erosion by customizing
or personalizing the online service experience on the basis of information
received from each customer. However, it has been shown analytically that the
payoff to such customization accrues to those firms that lock-in large numbers
of customers early. This creates an effective information barrier to entry that
enables these firms to increase price according to their customers' perceptions
of increased value. Later firms are unable to capture the same data from these
customers, thus failing to imitate the value-adding strategies of the earlier firms
effectively and being led to adopt lower prices."' This finding demonstrates
that any discussion of whether price levels rise or faU, or whether dispersion
increases or decreases, must refiect the patterns of competition that emerge in
the market of interest. We are still in the early days of competition on the Inter-
net and stable industry structures may not emerge in many such markets for
some time. Can we guarantee that book prices will continue to fall if the duop-
oly of Amazon and Barnes & Noble—with their huge customer databases—
comes to dominate book retailing?
Middlemen Will Die!
The late 1990s were to be the age of disintermediation. Futurist George
Gilder wrote that "in every industry—from retailing to insurance—the key
impact of the computer-network revolution is to remove the middleman.'""^
Through Internet technology, every manufacturer would be able to sell direct to
the public. The traditional sales force would be eliminated and we would witness
the demise of the middleman. However, the computer vendor Compaq provides
an example of the risks associated with such simplistic strategies (see sidebar).
The Compaq story is one that other firms are loath to repeat. The combination
of intermediary power and their proximity to the customer are the main reasons
why we have seen few successful examples of disintermediation. This has noth-
ing to do with whether or not profits are possible from disintermediation.
Rather, it has everything to do with deciding how to move into a new distribu-
tion channel without jeopardizing existing channel relationships. As noted by
Carson et al., just because something is feasible and preferable is only a neces-
sary, and not sufficient, condition for its adoption."*^ Institutional structures,
such as intermediaries, satisfy the complex requirements of customers and sup-
pliers that cannot be unraveled overnight.
Value as well as price characterizes purchase decisions and adept interme-
diaries can exploit new business models to provide customer value. As shown in
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Compaq Australia
Compaq's logic was straightforward enough, eliminate reseller margins and
utilize the savings to go direct to customers with a customizable, price-competitive
product. Unfortunately, the reality was not quite that simple. In Compaq's case, its
success has been determined largely by its long-standing, close channel relationship
with resellers. Not surprisingly, when these resellers learned of Compaq's decision
to sell direct to the customer, they let their displeasure be known.
Compaq Australia has been on the receiving end of this displeasure, vv'hen all Compaq products
were tossed out of the country's leading retail outlets.The cost to Compaq Australia of the debacle
is estimated at A$ 100 million in lost revenue. The Australian, August 24, 1999
In April 2001, Compaq Australia reopened discussions with leading retailers with the goal of having
its products put back on their shelves. The Australian, April 17,2001
Exhibit 3, there are still a number of opportunities for intermediaries to imple-
ment electronic versions of traditional business models or to create new value-
added business models based on high levels of IT functionality.
While it is inevitable that competition will eliminate intermediaries who
fail to add value, low barriers to entry and information asymmetries will con-
tinue to attract innovation. In the networked economy, intermediaries with a
sound understanding of the hypermedia environment will be able to capture
customer and product information in ways to ensure they have an important
role to play. Indeed, some argue that an increase in the number of intermedi-
aries is equally plausible as any predicted demise.'** They point to the new
economies of scale, scope, and knowledge that will allow new forms of "cyber-
mediaries" to flourish and they also argue that the supplier cannot easily assume
many of the functions of these intermediaries. For all these reasons—institu-
tional structures; new economies of scale, scope, and knowledge; and compe-
tence—it is premature to announce the death of the middleman.
Scale Is Irrelevant!
Esther Dyson, chair of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, suggested that
the Internet would change economies of scale in favor of the little guy, creating
a flatter competitive landscape. As a result, online firms would face less pressure
to grow and benefit from economies of scale.^' This is inconsistent with the
lessons of history, which have shown that the size of the firm or the network
tend to produce a simple logic. In the case of the network, the larger the net-
work the more attractive it is to users. The phenomenon of network externalities^"
is illustrated in transportation, telecommunications, and banking networks. An
oft-cited example of networks externalities is the competition between the Beta
VCR format of Sony and the VHS format of Matshushita. By licensing their tech-
nology to others, Matshushita was able to build scale rapidly and overcome the
head start of the pioneer Sony. Markets for portal companies (e.g., Yahoo.com),
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E X H I B I T 3. Examples ofValue Adding Intermediaries
Business
Model Value-adding Capabilities Internet Example
E-Auction Price discovery and demand collection
systems where customers state
product/price preferences which are
forwarded onto suppliers for consideration
Priceline (www.priceline.com)
Online Auction Sites:
eBay (vwwi'.ebaycom), QXL (www.qxl.com)
Value Chain Offering complementary goods, services
Integrator which aggregate information rich products
into a more complete package for
customers




Value Chain Specialize on particular value chain
Service function such as electronic payment
Provider or logistics
Package and Shipping:
FedEx (vwifw.fedex.com), UPS (vwwy.ec.ups.com)
Global Interbank Transaction Settler:
SWIFT (www.swift.com)
Information Privacy and trust providers, business
Brokers information and consultancy advice
Public Key & Certification Authority:
Verisign (vwwi/.verisign.com)




hardware (e.g., Intel), and software (e.g., Microsoft) provide more recent exam-
ples of companies deriving increased value from wider networks. It should be
noted that some have argued that while network effects are pervasive (whereby
the value of joining the network increases with the size of the network), net-
work externalities (whereby one actor owns the gains from the network effect)
are uncommon." This would not go against the basic argument that scale
remains important, but would suggest that it is difficult for one firm to capture
all the benefits of scale.
This can be seen in the example of Netscape. By its early use of the Web
to distribute free software, Netscape was able to build scale in its customer base
quickly. The more consumers using the Netscape browser, the more opportuni-
ties this created to extend Netscape's product range and to sell complementary
products (i.e., enterprise software) and services (i.e., a one-stop portal). Econo-
mies of scope became so powerful that, as seen from its mission statements,
Netscape no longer considered itself a browser company. However, it then failed
to take full advantage of these network-derived economies of scale and scope to
build revenue quickly enough and was overtaken by Microsoft in the browser
market, leading to, a collapse in its share price and takeover by AOL.
Whether real or virtual, the amount of strategic, physical, and mone-
tary resources a firm can bring to the competitive arena will continue to play
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a critical role in the networked economy. Inter-organizational systems require
standardization over a wide range of rules governing the size of data fields, for-
mat type, and various operating characteristics. Large firms usually have greater
bargaining power and are often able to encourage co-operation among channel
members—thereby establishing de facto standards. Such co-operation is often in
the best interests of the large firm. Large firms also have greater resources for
developing and protecting their brands and are able to absorb short-term losses
in order to mitigate the challenges posed by their smaller competitors.
Amazon provides an example of the importance of scale and resources.
Having invested considerably in building its brand strength, the company is
leveraging its network to provide a value-added service that goes beyond lower
prices. By storing information from various sources—authors, magazine reviews,
and reader comments—the company has developed a powerful information
service for its customers. The more books you buy, the more proficient the com-
pany's software becomes at identifying your preferences and finding a book that
you might like—differentiating the company from smaller competitors and cre-
ating powerful lock-in and barriers to entry. As our Netscape example shows,
this will not necessarily protect Amazon from other large competitors, like
Barnes and Noble or Bertelsmann, but it will surely make it difficult for the
smaller players in book retailing to compete.
Being First Is Key!
Silicon Valley worships trailblazers and speed to market. To gain an edge
in the new economy, there is no time to analyze and plan; being first is enough
to create an advantage.'^ Playboy magazine was able to extract first mover
advantages when it decided to distribute the magazine electronically in 1995.
As the first commercial Web site, the venture was novel, attracting the attention
of large numbers of Web surfers and a healthy fee-paying subscriber base.
Whether the success of Playboy.com was a result of pioneering advan-
tages, or whether it was due to its size, brand name, resources, and management
capabilities is an important question. The existence of first mover advantages has
been a widely espoused business principle as entrepreneurs and established cor-
porations compete in a race to be first to market. Unfortunately, the empirical
literature on first mover advantages is still undecided and no clear position has
emerged that supports the existence of enduring advantages to market pioneers.
Recent research suggests that being first to market can be beneficial, but, by
itself, is neither necessary nor sufficient to maintain a company's position as the
market evolves. Pioneers often miss the best opportunities by failing to: develop
the right strategic resources; leverage the mass market opportunities that are
presented to them; commit the necessary financial resources as the market
evolves; dominate in distribution, R&D, production or brand awareness; and
get the technology right on the first go." A classic example of this failure is the
Apple Newton.'"*
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In new markets like e-business, the magnitude of any first mover advan-
tage is proportional to the size of the market. Although the time to a critical
mass of consumer demand in these markets is getting shorter, in most cases it
still takes years to develop. In an industry dominated by rapid technological
innovations, high-risk investments, and market uncertainties, the chances of
developing the wrong strategic resources is a very real concern for managers.
Many pioneering efforts may prove poorly directed—leaving opportunities for
others to capitalize on the learning and opportunity.
If the pioneer has failed to achieve lock-in with large numbers of
customers or to otherwise build a defensible position, the savvy early follower
is often well placed to exploit their existing strategic resource base and core com-
petencies. Leveraging a nine million strong client base—which is larger than all
the online brokers combined—Merrill Lynch was well positioned to challenge
online pioneers such as Ameritrade and E*Trade. Having watched the pioneers
test the market, Merrill Lynch implemented its own unique business model,
providing investors with a valuable mix of human advice and online access. The
same logic applies to BarnesandNoble.com as an early follower into online book
retailing (see sidebar). While the online leader, Amazon, was not the first online
bookseller, it was the first to build online demand successfully through a series
of well-known innovations. In contrast, BarnesandNoble.com is attempting to
leverage its brand and large chain of physical stores into a major online pres-
ence. According to some, it is closing the gap on Amazon through features such
as more convenient return policies and human interaction."
Barnes and Noble
Amazon.com was established in July 1995 with "a mission to use the Inter-
net to transform book buying into the fastest, easiest, and most enjoyable shopping
experience possible." It took Barnes and Noble some time to realize the emerging
threat of Amazon and develop a strategy to combat Amazon's strengths.
BN.com, while slow to emerge, has leveraged its existing competencies to
compete with Amazon. These competencies include brand, warehousing capacity,
retail store integration, and existing links to media outlets (e.g., the Oprah book
club) and other chains (e.g., Starbucks), as well as the trust and recognition that
they have with existing "real world" customers.
The emergence of BN.com, and the pressure they exerted both exogenously
(as a competitor) and endogenously (through their inftuence on book suppliers),
has seen Amazon rethink parts of its own strategy—particularly with regard to
holding of inventory and fulfillment requirements. More recently, Bertelsmann-—
with its global strengths in direct marketing and in book and music publishing and
its growing interests in the electronic distribution of content—has become a major
shareholder in BN.com. This creates further competitive pressure on the leader,
Amazon.
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The choice of being a first mover is a critical one for managers, yet the
evidence provides little guidance. It is not clear which e-markets are amenable
or antithetical to first movers, hence there is no guarantee that firms like Ama-
zon will maintain their leadership as the market matures.
Winner Take All!
Entangled with the exhortation to be first, espoused theory also claimed
that digital markets would be less forgiving than traditional ones.'* The first firm
to "win" would capture most of the rents available from their marketplace, and
other players—even those competent in their field—would be marginalized. The
winner-take-all economy would thrive by leveraging network externalities and
improved access to comparative information provided by a Web infrastructure.
In reality, the claim is neither new nor confined to digital markets. Evi-
dence over several decades exists to show that technological change—driven
largely by the print media, radio, and television—has tended to move moder-
ately gifted individuals and organizations to the periphery. The necessity that
individuals compete against world experts or champions has become most
noticeable in the arts, entertainment, and sports, but it has also permeated busi-
ness, medicine, and the halls of academe." In this sense, winner-take-all mar-
kets are not new and have already wrought profound changes in economic and
social life.
More recent research by Xerox PARC has shown that in terms of usage
per site, digital markets follow a power "law" whereby a few top sites in each
of the categories they studied accounted for over half the volume of unique vis-
itors. They ascribe this concentration around a small number of sites to better
marketing and site usability.'* Formal work in economics has shown that a com-
pany with market power in two goods can, by bundling them together, make it
harder for rivals to enter the market." Microsoft Corporation offers the most
successful example of how bundling is used to defend its products (Word, Excel,
PowerPoint, and Explorer) from market competition. Others have shown that
information goods are influenced by economies of aggregation that characterize
supply- and demand-side economies of scale. Marketing managers can employ
aggregation economics to price discriminate, increase the value of new content,
and manipulate market entry and exit incentives.*"
Despite its intuitive appeal and the persuasive arguments, the winner-
take-all argument is far from conclusive. The profit motives that underpin
bundling are moderated by variance in consumer tastes. Current research has
shown that, in situations where markets have dissimilar values for different
products and services, the decision to unbundle can be more profitable.*' This
research more fully explains strategic behavior and provides the intuition for
why companies like Adobe and Real Audio choose to give away products rather
than bundle document readers and audio players with complementary prod-
ucts.*^ Simplistic assumptions that have been espoused about the capabilities of
competitors and the nature of competition are open to question. As noted, the
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Web might only be a complement to traditional marketing channels in many
circumstances. In these circumstances, the offline capabilities of firms and the
traditional nature of the competition between firms both become highly rele-
vant. Winner-take-all might apply to the Web component of their activities but
not to the other components, making the overall pattern of competition more
complex than envisaged by some of these authors. More generally, there is the
difficulty of capturing all the gains accruing from expanding networks.*' Finally,
although the Xerox PARC study identifying site traffic to be an important factor
in commercial viability is noteworthy, traffic is not the only factor of concern.
Similar "power laws" describe market share concentration in traditional markets
where no one would claim that the winner had captured all the profits.*̂ * That is,
the leading firm may have the highest profits but it may also have been unable
to drive out or severely restrict the share of its competitors.
There is evidence for and against the winner-take-all thesis. The question
as to whether the Web is more likely to lead to profit dominance or not remains
unresolved. Our speculation is that in many low-involvement B2C markets it
will not, but it might in those B2C or B2B markets where search and evaluation
processes are more thorough and customers more likely to identify and select
the best-performing firms (for example, B2C markets such as asset management
for wealthy individuals or B2B markets such as the purchase of critical
components).
Summary: Conflicting Worldviews
There is little doubt that the result of the e-business experiments occur-
ring today will have a significant impact on the way technology is used in the
social and business environment. While these developments in interconnectivity
represent a major technological innovation, the question is whether this repre-
sents a paradigm shift in the way business is conducted. One side of the argu-
ment is that the fundamental rules that have governed businesses for
centuries—supply versus demand, market competition, segmentation pricing,
contracting, and the nature of governance in the firm—will remain as relevant
today as they were when Adam Smith described the workings of a pin factory.
According to this stance, although e-business will have a dramatic impact on
many businesses and will demand new requirements from many managers, the
basic rules will not be altered. This is the position put forth by authors such as
Shapiro and Varian who attest to the durability of economic principles, even if
some (e.g., network externalities and versioning) are relatively new and hard
to find in traditional texts. In other words, there is no such thing as e-business,
there is just business and some of it is electronic. The counter stance claims that
the old rules of business will not apply and a sea change is underway in the
operation of firms. Booz-Allen & Hamilton best represents this position:
The Internet is not just about e-commerce, however. The real story is the
profound impact this medium will have on corporate strategy, organization,
and business models. Our research reveals that the Internet is driving a global
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market-place transformation and paradigm shift in how companies get things
done, how they compete and how they serve their customers,"*'
In other words, there is no business, bar e-business.
Is This a Revolution or Is It Evolution?
If we look on the industrial revolution as triggered by the development of
engines, we would be rightly justified as saying that James Watt's steam engine
was the trigger of the revolution to follow. If, however, we consider the indus-
trial revolution as a triumph of man in the use of power—with a wide variety of
consequences—then the industrial revolution is just one more event in an evo-
lutionary sequence, namely, the replacement of human and animal energy with
chemical energy. Clearly many people would espouse the first perspective, see-
ing Watt's engine as the trigger for a revolution in the way humans manipulate
their environment, with widespread impact on social and economic activity.
These impacts include the global transportation and distribution of people and
goods through the railway and steamship as well as the gains in productivity
and wealth that came from the steam-powered factory. Moreover, the industrial
revolution came to touch all members of society not only in what they did in their
daily lives, but in how they went about doing it. Castells defines the elements of
a true revolution in a similar manner:
The historical record of technological revolutions, , , shows that they are all
characterized by their pervasiveness, that is by their penetration of all domains
of human activity, not an exogenous source of impact, but as the fabric in which
such activity is woven. In other words, they are process oriented, besides inducing
new products."
In short, a revolution is a historic transformation in the doing and think-
ing about things, and it is one that is brought about through the diffusion of
transforming catalysts, be they ideas or technologies. Clearly, many people feel
that the invention of business applications for the Internet satisfies the criteria
for a "revolution." However, it is not the catalyzing technology that is in itself
revolutionary. What makes it revolutionary is the complementary development
of an ability to distribute and embed the benefits of this technology throughout
the economy—an ability that is social rather than technological. For example,
one of the many small ironies of the dawn of the 21" Century is that the back-
lash against globalization and technology is itself being coordinated and com-
municated through the Internet.*'
The Pervasiveness of E-Business
As we examine the historic record, major technological innovations have
had relatively long periods over which they have diffused through the economic
and social milieu. One of the hallmarks of the development of computers and
the Internet that is often used to herald a "revolution" is the speed with which
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E X H I B I T 4 . The Spread ofTechnology (Penetration Rates Years after Introduction,
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Source: Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, in Fortes, 7/7/97
it has diffused. Exhibit 4 presents this information as well as the diffusion paths
of other technologies over the past century. What is notahle about this graph is
that there has been a general increase in the speed with which all new inven-
tions have diffused through the society over time. Hence, we are left with the
currently unanswerable question, to what extent is the speed with which the IT
related inventions have diffused across the economy a cause or a consequence?
For example, the phenomenon of heanie habies was far more rapid than the
uptake of any IT related technology. However, we would not look on the phe-
nomenon of beanie babies as in any way revolutionary.
If we examine the up-take of computer technology and e-business, it is
only with the maturation of IT industries in the 1990s that any claim to perva-
siveness could be justified, and then only in certain sectors of advanced indus-
trial economies.** If we look at the most recent figures on IT from OECD
countries, while not ubiquitous in each sector of the economy, there are some
clear trends emerging in the uptake and use of information technology. An
important determining factor has been cost and its decline has been a signal of
the maturing of information technologies. According to some,*' the diffusion of
Internet usage in the tJnited States can be traced most notably to breakthroughs
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in the quality and performance of IT that have been matched by equally dra-
matic falls in the costs of acquiring IT infrastructure.
This discussion indicates that, for many businesses, the advent of IT is
not a pervasive phenomenon but that measures of diffusion may not be the
most appropriate measure of pervasiveness. At best, diffusion must be thought
as a necessary but not sufficient condition for pervasiveness to exist. For exam-
ple, surveys have shown that despite widespread adoption of Web technology, at
present most large established firms conduct relatively little of their value adding
activity on-line.^°
The history of the industrial revolution also shows a remarkable degree
of complementary development. For example, the industrial revolution was the
confluence of three complementary events, a revolution in agriculture, a revolu-
tion in manufacture of textiles, and a revolution in power. Hence, another per-
spective on pervasiveness is embodied in the degree to which one phenomenon
leads to change or development of complementary phenomenon. From this
perspective, the Internet and, by association, Internet-based e-business are not
stand-alone phenomena. Rather, the Internet represents an endogenous devel-
opment linked, perhaps randomly, with the progression of related technology
and the larger and somewhat more pervasive IT movement. To the extent that
we take this one step further and talk about e-business, our ability to discuss this
as a ubiquitous phenomenon loses some strength. It may be the result of a ubiq-
uitous phenomenon but fails to be justified as such in its own right unless it can
be shown to be the impetus for its own predecessor's formation.
A consequent issue is that the Internet and e-business could be pervasive
not because they have affected a large proportion of business but that where
they have had an effect, the effect has been dramatic. Hence, the key to claiming
pervasiveness could lie in the productivity dividends that accrue through use of
the technology. However, the evidence is not supportive of major dividends from
IT:
[IT is] not ushering in a period of faster growth of output and total factor produc-
tivity. Rather returns to investment in IT equipment have been successfully inter-
nalized by computer producers and computer users . . . The rewards are large
because of the swift pace of technical change in the production of computers and
the rapid deployment of IT equipment through substitution, not because of
spillovers to third parties standing on the sidelines of the computer revolution."
We are left with the conclusion that e-business cannot pass a test based
on the pervasiveness of the phenomenon at this time, particularly if we keep the
discussion focused around commercial operations. Although basic IT infrastruc-
ture is pervasive from the standpoint of diffusion, much of this is substitution
from one factor input to another—this is as much a shift along an existing pro-
duction function as it is an expansion of the frontier of production possibilities.
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Process Orientation
Process orientation is the key benchmark of any successful technology.
In each of the industrial revolutions, the inputs that have brought about change
have been linked to the successful orientation of process to technology. In the
case of e-business, process orientation is linked to the informational characteris-
tics of the businesses and, as a derivative of that linkage, the ability to network
both internally and externally. Productivity gains are only possible once the
technology has had an impact on process:
Simply providing a powerful new desktop tool won't transform the way people
work together . . . Creating change throughout an enterprise requires a compre-
hensive solution that addresses the full fabric of organizational culture.'̂
This suggests that process orientation is more about the changes that can
be brought about within an organization's culture than it is about the diffusion
of technology. Indeed, the history of the inter-networked enterprise has been
described by some as an evolution of organizational processes rather than tech-
nological changes (see Exhibit 5).
Given the convergence of information technology and work practices,
any claims to a revolutionary impact go against the grain of existing evidence.
While the technology may be revolutionary, the process orientation itself is not.
Process orientation is driven by factors of efficiency, economy, and effectiveness.
These three factors will rarely, if ever, occur together as a direct result of revolu-
tionary technological change. Because of the way people learn, it is impossible
to match revolutionary technology with the evolution of work practice. People
learn to adapt technology into their work process, while the technology feeds off
this implementation. When presented with such a framework, one can argue, as
does Castells, that what has occurred has been a result of an evolutionary proc-
ess of IT integration into work practices and not as a result of a revolutionary
vision for where IT would lead work practices.
E X H I B I T 5. The Alliance for Converging Technologies Framework
Process Orientation Transformative Quaiity
(The Promise) Technoiogy (Productivity Dividends)
The Effective Individual Personal Multimedia Task and Learning Eff"iciency
The High PerfornnanceTeam Workgroup Connputing Business Process and Job Redesign
The Integrated Enterprise Enterprise Infostructure (Intranets) Organizational Transformation
The Extended Enterprise Interenterprise Computing (Extranets) Recasting External Relationships
The Intemetworked Business The Net Wealth Creation and Social Development
Source: D.Tapscott, TTie Digital Economy. Promise and Perii in the Age of Networked inteiiigence (New York. NY: McGraw-Hill, 1996).
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The evidence of the last two years also suggests that e-business will
evolve in such an incremental fashion. Most of the radical business models lost
their appeal when they failed to generate revenues. The startups that survived
into the new millennium are a small proportion of the initial population and
few of these look likely to establish major new markets or challenge traditional
incumbents. Furthermore, few are profitable. Indeed, when one looks for evi-
dence of online B2C businesses that are profitable, most of these appear to be
bricks-and-clicks, where the online business is an adjunct or extension of tradi-
tional strategies and capabilities. This may also be true in the B2B space (e.g.,
firms such as NECX or developments such as Covisent). So we are left with a
handful of startups as pioneers of the "revolution" (firms such as Amazon, eBay,
eTrade, and Yahoo in the B2C space, or FreeMarkets and eSteel in the B2B
space). Undoubtedly, these firms have made an impact, but this impact is far
less than that envisaged by the e-revolutionaries two years ago.
Summary: Evolutionary versus Revolutionary—Should We Worry?
In challenging the popular myth that e-business is revolutionary, man-
agers can get a clearer understanding of the strategic options available. Like all
myths, this one captures some elements of the truth—as was clearly the case
with the computer revolution. The popular claim that the development of the
transistor explains sufficiently the progress of computing, ignores the significant
infiuence supporting technologies (e.g., disk storage) had on the development of
the working computer. In a similar vein, claims that e-business is driving revolu-
tionary business change are misleading and only partly correct. Social require-
ments govern technology (not the other way around) and current efforts to
"virtualize" business have not been pervasive or process oriented enough to
warrant the term revolution.
For managers, however, the real value in this conclusion relates more to
market entry and the likely rate of imitation. Sensible strategies that effectively
integrate brick-and-mortar facilities with an Internet presence take time to
materialize. During an evolutionary period, timing of entry can be delayed until
strategies are fully developed, the technical architecture is robust, and mecha-
nisms to monitor e-business are understood. Providing classic customer service
is the key and repeat purchasing will be based on service capabilities across all
levels, from product selection to customer responsiveness, order fulfillment, and
on-time delivery.
If there is an unpredictable revolutionary character to the phenomena we
are experiencing, it lies in the nature of the way in which people, rather than
businesses, interact. For many organizations—governments, NGOs, schools, and
universities—their raison d'etre is not about productivity and profit. There has
been considerable social experimentation occurring with regard to the way in
which many groups communicate. The ability of associations such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights in China to bring infiuence to bear on govern-
ments and coordinate effectively has undergone a sea change. Publishing groups
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such as Pearson, FT Knowledge, Thomson, Universitas 21, and the University of
Phoenix are attempting to change the nature of business education and there is
little doubt that the Internet has expanded learning horizons for children. From
this perspective, the Internet is a "foci for genuine personal interchange and the
development of complex networks of social relations."^'
However, as opposing trends indicate, this is not a libertarian's nirvana.
Those same intelligent agents that can find the consumer a cheap rental car have
the potential to comb the web for information about individuals and pass it on
seamlessly to others without anyone's approval. With the proliferation of
pornography, racial and social hatred, and intolerance of multiple sorts, the
inability of the legal system to anticipate the problems and solve the jurisdic-
tional issues is daunting.''* The recent case in French courts attempting to force
Yahoo! to cease providing access to services auctioning Nazi memorabilia is sim-
ply one of the more notable cases.
As Peter Drucker notes, "with these major new technologies came major
new social institutions: the modern postal service, the daily paper, investment
banking, and commercial banking, to name just a few. Not one of them had
much to do with the steam engine or with the technology of the Industrial Rev-
olution in general. It was these new industries and institutions that by 1850 had
come to dominate the industrial and economic landscape of the developed coun-
tries."'' Just as someone in 1801 would have had difficulty predicting the new
industries and institutions of 1850, in 2001 it is difficult to predict what the new
industries and institutions of 2050 will be—and in particular the extent to which
they will embody widespread use of the Internet, either for social or commercial
purposes.
Issues and Questions for Future Consideration
Truly revolutionary change often presents challenges in direct proportion
to the benefits it offers. So it must have been in the rise of the factory and the
subsequent atomization of the artisan's workshop. So it surely was with the
development of the railroad and the impact increased mobility had on economic,
societal, and political dimensions. However, similar claims of an e-business revo-
lution that will fundamentally change the way business is conducted are still
largely premature.
Predictions regarding the demise of brands, economies of scale, middle-
men, and the like have failed to materialize. Advances in information technolo-
gies have yet to change in any significant manner the way major decisions are
made in business. Instead those principles that have served us well for a cen-
tury—identify customer value propositions and put together the right people,
processes, and technical resources in an effectively managed manner—are still
as relevant today as ever.
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If the e-business revolution is to occur, then answers to nevŝ  challenges
will be required to ensure the costly nature of e-business development is wisely
managed. What is best practice in an e-business environment, and how do firms
decide whether the complex chain of upstream and downstream virtual rela-
tionships is over- or under-designed? How many specialized investments have
to be made and which governance structures will work best in a virtual alliance?
Establishing trust may be the easy part; but it is the ongoing management
of the relationship that is likely to be the hardest part. Building relationships will
be even more important in an e-business world, where multiple channels and
interaction points create a level of complexity not experienced previously.''* Like
its predecessors (e.g., EDI and ERP) e-business is likely to play an important role
in certain markets and for certain types of firm. However, e-business is not a
"silver bullet" and will not meet all trading requirements or provide a competi-
tive edge for all firms. To ascertain just how the Internet fits into their strategies,
firms need to put in place sensemaking approaches that look beyond the simplis-
tic views and strategies of the Bubble years. They need to be able to answer fun-
damental questions such as:
• Does the Internet enable us to significantly enhance our value proposition
to customers?
• Does the Internet suit the nature of our product and appeal?
• Can our brand attract customers to our web site?
• What value-added services and techniques can we use to encourage
"lock in"?
• Does the Internet significantly increase the efficiency of our value chain?
• What are the savings in transaction costs?
• How do we work with infomediaries and other new channels?
• How can we minimize conflicts with traditional value chain partners?
• How do we organize to build a successful online business?
• What is the required relationship between our offiine and online
activities?
• Where do we obtain the necessary online marketing and web site
capabilities?
• How do we establish the appropriate internal incentives for the online
business to flourish without damaging the existing business?
The crash of 2000 has provided welcome breathing space for established
firms to work out their answers to these and many other questions of Internet
strategy. The strategies they will choose are more likely to be incremental appli-
cations of Web technology in those settings where it is highly appropriate and
where they can implement it well. In forming these strategies they must focus
more on traditional rules and theories of business and pay less attention to radi-
cal IT gurus and consultants. For if the views of these revolutionaries were valid.
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why is it that now is such a great time to pick up Web technology at bargain
basement prices.
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